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Preliminary 
During this past decade, many countries have addressed the 
question of how their financial services sector shou ld be regulated. 
The UK has seen the creation of the Financial Services Authority 
and the demise of the self-regulatory system fo rmerly organized 
under the Financial Services Act of 1986. In the wake of the recent 
Parmalat and Fazio scandals, Italy toyed with the notion of creating 
a "Super-Consob" and the curtailing of some of Banca D' Ttalia 's 
functions. In these past few years, single regulatory structures have 
been established in several countries in and outside the European 
Union. These have included Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Mauritius, 
and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Other 
countries or jurisdictions have been busy re-considering or 
reforming their regulatory arrangements. 
This paper primarily seeks to trace the development of a single 
regulato1y authority for financial services in Malta, recording a 
sequence of impo1iant decisions and events marking a process 
HO The original version of this pap_er had been completed for publication in th is journal in 
August 2003. It had been loosely based on a talk, accompanied by a power-point 
presentation, on the subject "Setting up a single un ified financial services autii"ority -
advantages and disadvantages, an.d developments in Malta and beyond", given on the 3 
October 2001 to participants ai the Malta-Cdt11monwealth Third Count1y Training 
Programme (organized jointly by the Islands ani:l Small States Institute at the Foundation for 
International Studies and the Commonwealth Secretar'iat). Regrettably, due to transit ional 
editorial boards, the journal has not been published since then. Having been dusted, rev ised 
and updated, it now attempts to show the position as at July 2006. The paper reflects the 
author's personal views and does not represent any official policy. 
351 Senior Lecturer in the Commercial Law Department, University of Malta, mainly on 
financial services and consumer legislation, and Director for Legal and International 
Relations with the Malta Financial Services Authority. 
- 25 1 -
A Single Unified Supervisory Authority for Financial Services in Malta and beyond - some Legal and Regula1ory Issues 
launched in 1994 and only finalized in 2003. Upon completion of 
this project, Malta joined a then still relatively small number of 
jurisdictions where the supervision of the entire financial services 
sector was entrusted to one single agency. Indeed, the Malta 
F inancial Services Authority352 (MFSA) is now the single unified 
regulatory authority for the whole financial services sector in 
Malta. It exercises supervisory oversight in the three traditional 
areas of financial services activity, namely banking, insurance and 
securities. 353 
This brief paper does not tell the full sto1y of how and why the 
original Malta International Business Authority354 became the 
Malta Financial Services Centre (MFSC) and then, later, the 
MFSA. It is also the tale of how a smallish regulato1y agency with 
an exclusively offshore mission found itself re-constituted and re-
designed into a more substantial regulato1y authority with 
consolidated supervisory responsibility for the entire domestic 
financial services sector. The Maltese experience offers an 
interesting case study within an international context that seems to 
be in perpetual flux. 
This paper assumes agreement on the proposition that providers of 
financial services to the public should be properly supervised by 
specialized administrative agencies set up for that purpose. This 
shall allow it to focus attention on the administrative structures set 
up to unde1iake such supervision in Malta and in several other 
selected jurisdictions. Research shows that countries have devised 
different solutions as to how best to regulate their financial services 
industry. Some countries have established a single regulatory 
structure, whereas others, more numerous, continue to allocate 
different responsibilities to different agencies. Also interesting is 
m Established by the Malta Financial Services Authori ty Act, Chapter 330 of the Laws of 
Malta. 
rn Securities business includes the financial markets, investment services and collective 
investments schemes. 
354 Established in 1989 under the Malta International Business Activities Act, the former 
Chapter 330 of the Laws of Malta. 
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the finding that the single regulator jurisdictions have actually 
adopted a variety of structures and models. 
The point of depa1iure for this discussion therefore is that countries 
are still allowed, indeed have, to make up their own minds as how 
best to organise their internal regulatory structures. This is still a 
matter to be decided by domestic national law. Neither the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) nor the older and more developed 
European Union (EU), both of which shall now be considered here, 
imposes or proposes any specific financial services administrative 
framework or regulatory model for their respective member states. 
An introductory note on the international dimension 
(a) The World Trade Organization355 
Within the World Trade Organization framework, financial 
services regulation is governed by the General Agreement on Tracie 
in Services (GATS).356 The GATS does not prevent members from· 
imposing authorization requirements provided these do not breach 
the country's obligations or commitments (especially on market 
access and national treatment). Article 2(a) of the GATS in fact 
states that: 
" .. . a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for 
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a jiducimy duty is 
o'wed by a financial se1-11ice supplier, or to ensure the integrity and 
stability of the financial system." 
m See generally Opening markets in Financial Services, WTO Publications, 1997: Dobson 
W. and Jacquet P., Financial Services Liberalization in the WTO, Institute for International 
Economics, 1998. 
356Annex IB to the Final Act establishing the WTO signed in Marrakesh in 199-l, which 
came into force on I Januaiy 1995. 
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Accordingly, prudential measures are not considered as limitations 
on market access and national treatment, and need not be listed in a 
country's schedule of specific commitments. 
While the WTO Agreement does not require this, most countries 
would in fact have some form of state authorization mechanism for 
all or some of their financial services providers. The huge 
economic, legal and cultural differences that divide its member 
states357 makes it difficult to achieve agreement on a common 
framework for financial services regulation. The WTO itself could 
not go further in this field as it has no competence to impose any 
particular regulatmy system. This difficulty also suggests that at 
this stage no ideal universal model for financial regulation capable 
of application to eve1y countJy, irrespective of its size or 
circumstances, can be envisaged. 
(b) The European Union 
Neither the European Commission nor the vanous EU financial 
services Directives stipulate how a member state's regulatory 
structures should be desi gned.358 They do however broadly require 
that a member state be in a position to fulfil its Treaty obligations 
and to transpose and properly implement the various directives. As 
a more integrated and cohesive grouping than the WT0,359 the 
European Union issues various sets of nonns that eve1y member 
state must follow, paiiicularly with the aim of promoting the 
internal, or single, market and the harmonization of regulation in 
various fields. In the financial services field , recent EU Directives 
explicitly require member st;:ites to set up effective superviso1y 
agencies with sufficient competence and power to implement the 
relevant rules. The EU single passpo1i concept, for instance, 
broadly requires member states to establi sh an effective home 
357 These include some of the ri ches t and most developed countries and some of the poorest 
and least developed nations. 
358 See generall y, Challenges to the Structure of Financial Supervision in the EU, Centre fo r 
European Policy Studies, (ed. Green D.), July 2000. 
359 See generally, Farrel M., EU and WTO Regulatory Frameworks: complementary or 
competition?, London European Research Centre, European Dossier Series, Kogan Page 
Lim ited, 1999. 
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supervisory body able to evaluate licence applications, to apply the 
fit and proper test and to supervise its licence-holders. The home 
supervisory authority needs to be capable of supervising the 
operations carried out by its licensees both in its own territory and 
in other EU member states. It is also obliged to exchange 
infomiation and to collaborate with equivalent regulators from 
other member states. 
Neve1iheless, the EU neither imposes nor suggests any pa1i icular 
model or design for financial services supervision in its member 
states. Indeed, the members of the EU have adopted a variety of 
supervisory arrangements. If one considers the area of securities 
business supervision, no paiiicular model is spelt out and the EU 
financial services Directives do not dictate how a member state 's 
securities regulator should be organized, what it should do and 
what juridical status it should enjoy. These matters remain within 
the internal competence and discretion of the member states. The 
Directives require the member states to set up a supervisory body 
e1tjoying powers that are adequate to perfonn the obligations 
arising under the various Directives. The recent Market Abuse 
Directive now requires each member state to designate one national 
agency responsible for all the obligations aris ing under this 
Directive.360 The designated agency shall have to be able to 
exercise a number of specified powers, including the power to 
require information, to make compliance vis its and to take a series 
of other listed measures.361 The nominati011 of a single agency was 
deemed essential to ensure close and rapid exchange of information 
and assistance in cross-border investigations between the security 
regulators of the membel· states. Where a member state has two (or 
more) securities regulators,362 it will have to nominate one of them 
to exclusively assume all"the Directive obligations.363 
/ 
36-0 Directive 2003 16 IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse). See recital 36 and article 11 . 
This Directive was transposed into Maltese legislation through the Prevention of Financial 
Markets Abuse Act 2005 (PFMA), Act no. IV of2005. 
36 1 The MFSA is the competent authority for all purposes of the PFMA, in tenns of Miele 2. 
362 This was the case in Malta between 1994 and 2003 with the MSE and the MFSC sharing 
the task of supervising the financial markets and the provision of investment services. Until 
recently, France too had fragmented supervisory structures in place in the securities field. 
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It is useful to quote recital 36 of this Directive on this point: 
"A variety of competent authorities in Nfember States, having 
different responsibilities, may create confusion among economic 
actors. A single competent authority should be designated in each 
.Member State to assume at least final responsibility for supervising 
compliance with the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, 
as well as international collaboration." 
Beyond this obligation, each member state is still allowed to 
develop the system of regulation it considers most effective and 
appropriate within the realities of its economic, institutional and 
legislative circumstances. This approach appears to be also in line 
with the principle of subsidiarity introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty. Although the European Union has achieved a significant 
degree of harmonisation of rules, member states still have very 
different regulatory arrangements. Some have moved towards a 
single unified regulator, while others have studiously avoided that 
approach. 
Supervisory agencies in the different member states exercise 
different roles and functions, enjoying dissimilar legal and political 
status and operational autonomy. One finds significant disparities 
in the method of the appointment of their governing council, the 
term of their appointment, the financing of the agency, the rights of 
levying fines and of issuing binding regulations, the way they are 
audited and by whom, and their repo1iing obligations. 
Several EU accession countries still have a tripartite sharing of 
supervisory functions, more or less neatly divided into supervision 
of banking, insurance and securities business. These include 
These were eventually merged in August 2003 with the establishment of the Autorite' des 
Marches Financier. 
36; A simi lar provision is now found in the MJFlD - see article 48 paragraph I. On -the 
contra1y, its predecessor, the ISO - Counci l Directive 93/22/EEC of I 0 May 1993 on 
investment services in the securities field, better known as the ISO, which is sti ll in force but 
shall shortly be replaced - did not require a single designation but only required member 
states to "designate the competent authorities whi ch are to carry out the duties provided for 
in this Directive. They shall infonn the Commission thereof indicating any division of those 
duties." (Article 22). 
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Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Slovenia. Up till 
2003, Poland still had four separate agencies, while Bulgaria at that 
stage remarkably had five separate supervisory bodies, which 
qualified it as one of the most fragmented regulatory structures in 
the world.364 Since 2000, Hungary has had a single unified agency 
which consolidated the competence of three former regu latory 
agencies. Belgium has had a unified regulatory agency since I 
January 2004 when the Banking, Finance and Insurance 
Commission (CBF A)365 was set up following the merger of the 
former Banking and Insurance Commiss ion and the Insurance 
Superviso1y Authority. 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have a ll had an 
autonomous single unified regulatory authority for quite some time .. 
Gennany and Austria have these past few years replaced their 
fonner multiple regulator structures with a single unified regulatory 
agency combining the supervision of banking, insurance and 
securities business. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia are special cases. They have 
both recently consolidated the financial supervisory functions into 
a single regulat01y structure. In each case, however, it is the 
national central bank that has been assigned the ro le. Slovakia 
passed legislation, the Financial Market Supervision Act, whereby 
the National Bank of Slovakia366 became the single unified 
regulator for the entire sector in late 2005. · The Czech Republic367 
implemented its single agency structure even more recently, in 
March 2006. They are the only two EU states which have 
~pervision concentrated in their respective national central bank. 
/ 
36
' Bulgaria has since re-shaped its regulatory structures in ~003 with the creation of the 
Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission which merged three former bodies. The 
Commission supervises securities and insurance business. The Bulgarian National Bank has 
retained banking supervision. 
365 Commission Bancaire, Financiere et des Assurances. 
366 See www.nbs.sk 
367 See www.cnb.cz 
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( c) Some other International Aspects 
Several countries have adopted or are moving towards a fonn of 
single unified regulat01y structure. No identifiable common pattern 
is however apparent, and these countries have gone about the 
process in different ways and perhaps for different reasons. Most 
have set up a new organization separate and at arm's length from 
the national central bank. In a few countries, and exceptionally, the 
national central bank itself has been appointed the single unified 
authority for the entire financial services sector. This is the 
position in Singapore, The Gambia and now also Slovakia. Until 
recently, Mauritius too was moving in that direction, but following 
political and policy changes, the project has been curtailed. The 
Bank of Mauritius will be retaining its traditional banking 
supervision function, while a new Financial Services Commission 
was set up in 2001. This agency has been designed as a unitaiy 
financial regulator, with responsibility for all-non-banking financial 
activities, mainly insurance, securities and offshore companies.368 
Most countries still assign bank supervision responsibilities to their 
national central banks. Some may assign to their central bank an 
additional supervisory responsibility, which means either insurance 
or securities business supervision. 
A case in point is Switzerlai1d which has two federal regulato1y 
agencies, the Federal Banking Commission, which supervises 
banking and securities activities, and the Federal Office of Private 
Insurance. A major financial location, Switzerland seems to have 
recently succumbed to the channs of the single regulatory concept. 
The Financial Times reported on 19 April 2006 (Swiss super-
regulator begins to take shape) that "after almost a decade in the 
making", a new agency to be known as Finma would sho1tly 
consolidate the Federal Banking Commission with the insurance 
regulator and the money-laundering office. Japan, another major 
financial location, has had a single Financial Services Authority 
since 2000. 
368 see www.bom.intnet.mm and www.fscmauritius.org 
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Many countries still retain what may be called the "classical" 
tripaiiite division of responsibilities. China, the Czech Republic 
and Italy, to take just three examples, still have three d ifferent 
regulators broadly mirroring the tlu·ee traditional categories of 
financial services. 
In broad tenns, Italy distributes its regulatory competences between 
the Banca D'Italia for banking supervision, the Commissione 
Nazionale per le Societa' e la Borsa (CONSOB) for securities 
business supervision and the Istituto per la vigilanza sulle 
assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo (ISV AP) for insurance 
. . 369 
superv1s10n. 
France and the USA are two countries with a very specialized and 
independent securities commission, totally separate from and 
unrelated to the banking supervisory body. Clearly, federal 
jurisdictions, such as the USA and Canada, which have to deal with 
the constitutional division of responsibilities and jurisdiction 
between the central federal government and the individual states or 
provinces may make the discussion slightly more complicated. At 
the federal level, Canada does not have a single regulator system, 
whereas the provinces of Ontario and Quebec have in recent years 
established a single regulatory agency. 
What this investigation therefore suggests is that it is not advisable 
to copy another country's model or to follow perceived fashionable. 
trends. A model that may function coherently in one country may 
prove less effective in another, where the prevailing cond itions are 
cl.issimilar. In devising a regulatory structure, one should carefully 
assess the size, nature,, depth and objectives of the fi nancial 
services sector under consideration, the state of development' of the 
fjnancial system and of t)1e econom)/ in general, local politics and 
public expectations, the efficiency of the administrative systems, 
the quality ofthe legislation and human resources as well 'as other 
369 As already remarked earlier the regulatory architecture in Italy has recently come under 
severe criticism and scmtiny fo llowing the Cirio, Pannalat and Fazio incidents. The Banca 
D'Italia's fom1er leading role in competition in the banking sector has now been reduced 
whereas the CONSOB 's investigative powers have been strengthened. 
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national characteristics as the size of the country and of its 
population. In lesser-developed countries, it has often been found 
preferable to entrust the supervision of banking activity to the well-
tried and respected national central bank, and not attempt to create 
novel untested administrative structures . 
The idea or perception that a single unified regulator is an ideal 
arrangement for small jurisdictions is often repeated, but just as 
frequently challenged. Iceland, Estonia, Guernsey, Slovakia and 
Mauritius are just five of several relatively small jurisdictions 
which have, in their own peculiar way, implemented a single or 
unified regulatory structure.370 On the other hand, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the single regulator in the United 
Kingdom and the German BAFIN supervise a leading, substantial 
and well-developed financial sector. Size is therefore just one of a 
series of relevant factors, and is not, by itself, a conclusive factor. 
What may be appropriate for a big jurisdiction may be 
inappropriate for a smaller countty, and vice versa. Superviso1y 
arrangements which individual countries have put in place are 
usually the product of legal, political and historical events, and 
cannot be properly understood outside these contexts. A very brief 
reference to two ve1y different jurisdictions which both adopted a 
single regulatory structure under legislation adopted in 2001 will 
serve as an introduction to the Maltese experience. 
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services and Markets Act 
200 l and the Financial Services Authority can trace their origins to 
the well publicized inefficiencies and anomalies of the self-
regulatory framework organized under the Financial Services Act 
of 1986 and to the increasing impact of EU Directives on the single 
passport in financial services. Another impo1iant factor was the 
election, in 1997, of a new Labour Government whose electoral 
platform included the radical reform of the UK regulato1y 
framework and the termination of the reliance on self regulat91y 
organizations. 
370 These models show substantial variances; but regrettably space does not permit a 
comprehensive comparison between the single regulatory models implemented in these 
small jurisdictions. 
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Estonia embraced the single regulator concept in 2002 following 
the passage of a 2001 law,371 when a new agency, the Estonian 
Financial Supervision Authority, was created. This new agency is 
closely linked organizationally to the Estonian Central Bank on 
which it still largely relies for administrative and logistical support, 
including the sharing of the Bank's premises. To understand the 
reasons behind this paiiicular arrangement, one may take into 
account Estonian political and administrative realities including the 
country's only fairly recent moves to a democratic status, market 
economy and de-centralisation of power. 
The Particular case of Malta 
In 1993, supervision over financial services operations was greatly 
fragmented and shared between four different entities. The Central 
Bank of Malta372 supervised banking activities and in practice acted 
as an overseer of the entire local financial system. The Malta Stock 
Exchange373 licensed and supervised stockbrokers, and authorized 
listings on the single Exchange which it both operated and 
monitored. The Minist1y of Finance still supervised the domestic 
insurance market in terms of the Insurance Business Act of 1981 . 
The Malta International Business Authority (MIBA)374 was the sole 
regulator of the entire offshore (financial and corporate) sector.375 
In effect, the MIBA was the single specialized unified regulatory 
authority for the offshore business sector. This role extended to 
ordinaiy trading and holding companies, as well as to banks, 
insurance operations and securities business that could be set up 
u£1der the special offsho're legislation. The creation of the MJBA 
also meant that for some ,years Malta had two separate regulators 
371 The Financial Supervision Authority Act which ~11tered into force on I .lune 200 I 
372 Established under the Central Bank of Malta Act 1967. 
373 Set up by the Malta Stock Exchange Act 1990. 
rn Established by the Malta International Business Activities Act. 
375 Actually, very few of the companies authorized by the MFSA actually carried out any 
financial services business. Most offshore co111panies were 111oslly s111all holding and 
trading co111panies. No offshore investment services operations were ever licensed and only 
five offshore banking licenses were issued. The legal fra111ework for offshore business 
activities lapsed in 2004. 
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for banking, for insurance, and for securities business. This 
duplication led to some anomalies and raised concerns not only 
locally but also in the international sphere. 
Originally announced to Parliament by the Minister of Finance in 
November 2003 in the budget speech for 1994, the single regulator 
objective was implemented in stages. Throughout 1994, the first 
legislative steps were adopted by Parliament. These included 
substantial amendments to existing legislation and the introduction 
of several impo1iant new laws, such as new laws on insider dealing, 
money-laundering, banking and investment services. 1994 was a 
crucial year and a turning point in financial services regulation in 
Malta: among other things, it launched and laid the foundations for 
the establishment of a single regulatory authority for financial 
services. 
In 1994, four years after submitting its application for European 
Union membership, government decided it was time to bring some 
order to financial services legislation and supervision and to 
consolidate and upgrade it. It also decided to tenninate the local 
offshore business activity. In this context, it may have been 
surprising that a policy decision was also to construct the new all-
embracing regulato1y system around the former offshore authority. 
Government decided against disbanding the young offshore 
authority,376 and instead developed it into a more comprehensive 
administrative authority with even wider functions, responsibilities 
and powers. This twist in favour in MIBA's fortune was ironic in 
the light of Government's decision to abandon offshore. Offshore 
business was to be phased out but MIBA was to be retained and 
considerably strengthened . New offshore registrations were only 
allowed up till the end of December 1996 and all offshore activities 
had to cease by September 2004. Offshore business was to be 
phased out.377 
376 Which had started operations only five years previously. 
377 Offshore Business registration ended in December 1996 and the sector drew to a final 
conclusion in September 2003. See generally article by Fabri D. and Baldacchino G. in 
Hampton . 
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As part of the 1994 refonns, MIBA was re-constituted and re-
named as the Malta Financial Services Centre (MFSC) and was 
assigned responsible for the supervision over insurance378 and 
investment services activities.379 The supervision of banks and 
other financial operators known collectively as financial 
institutions380 remained, for the time being, entrusted to the CBM, 
and was only transfeJTed a few years later.38 1. 
One of the policy cornerstones underlying the extensive l 994 
reforms was the official identification of the MIBA, now newly-
styled as the MFSC, as the future single unified regu lator for the 
entire sector of financial services as an objective for 111ed ium ter111 
objective. This objective was not achieved overnight. At the end 
of 1994, despite the extensive legislative changes undertaken 
during that year, three separate regulators were sti ll in operation: 
the Central Bank of Malta, the Malta Stock Exchange and the 
MFSC. It took almost an entire decade to complete the project for 
establishing the single unified regulator. Various factors explain 
why it took Malta several years to consolidate financial services 
regulation in one single body.382 At a political level, consensus on 
the future role of the CBM was lacking and like Malta's EU 
membership application, the move towards a single agency was 
suspended for a few years during the short-lived Labour 
government 1996-8, and then re-activated in late 1998 fo l lowing a . 
change of government. 
3
,
78Responsibility for supervision'Ofthe local insurance market had been transferred from the 
Ministry of Finance to the MFSA in December 1994 by means of a '"Delegation of 
Authority", published as Government Notice 752 of 1994 on the 25'h November 2004. The 
Minister of Finance delegated most of his powers under the 198 1 Act to the MFSC. This 
delegation came into force on the I December 2604. · 
379 Under the new Investment Ser\lices Act 1994. I 
380 Under a new Act called the Financial-' Institutions Act which regulated several 
unconnected non-banking financial activities including foreign exchange deal ing, lending, 
financial leasing and forfeiting. 
38 1 See below. 
382 Hardly, any local literature on this subject exists and this paper does not purport to fill 
the entire gap. 
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[ndeed, following the extensive legislative reforms of 1994, little or 
no fmiher progress was then achieved for a number of years. The 
change of government that followed the 1996 General Elections,383 
and the political differences that existed on the issue, cmiailed 
further developments in this area. Then, late in 1998, fo llowing 
fresh General Elections, the Minister of Finance in the new 
Nationalist Party government, the same Minister who had 
originally launched the project in 1994, re-confirmed his 
government's official policy to pursue the single regulatory agency 
project to completion. 
Mr J Dalli announced his plan to re-activate the single regulato1y 
agency project in November 1998 during his Budget Speech for 
1999. A year later, in a speech given to the second Asset 
Management Conference, in October 1999, he re-iterated his plan: 
"Jn the ve1y near fiiture, the regulation and supervision of banking 
and credit institutions will be moved to the Malta Financial 
Services Centre." 384 
The exercise was executed in a sequence of steps achieving 
completion between 2002 and early 2003, with the transfer of bank 
supervision and the assignment of the roles of Listing Authority 
with the duty to administer the F inancial Markets Act to the 
'"When the Labour Party government replaced the then Nationalist Party in government. 
384 The Times repo1i of the 22 October 1999 ("Central Bank governor against transfer of 
regulatory ro le") recorded the negative (and surprised) reaction of the then out-going 
Governor of the Central Bank of Malta): 
"Express ing surprise at the decision, he said that in small countries the regulatory aspect 
tended to be in the hands of central banks, which had the financial and human resources to 
carry out the role effectively." 
The Governor was also quoted as having said : 
··1 am not aware of any preparations made by government in this respect. So when Mr Dalli 
is saying that this is something which is expected to take place imminently, I don't know 
what he is referring to ...... It's simple io make such a pronouncement but it 's not that easy to 
put into effect because specialized human resources are not that available in the country." 
This particular problem was eventually resolved when the larger part of the bank 
supervisors at the CBM accepted new employment with the MFSA. This ensured continuity 
of supervision and the retention of informat ion and experience. This issue also shows that 
the development of a single regulator may involve human resources and management 
problems. 
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MFSA.385 Under that Act, the MFSA started overseeing the 
operations of the MSE, whose fo1111er regulatory role had ceased 
and now operating as an authorized investment exchange in . terms 
of the re-styled Financial Markets Act.386 
1994 saw the adoption of a brand new law on banking. Tnitially, 
the CBM was retained as "competent authority", but it ·was 
government's declared intention to eventually also transfer banking· 
supervision from the CBM to the Centre.387 In the next seven years 
between 1995 - 2001, nothing of much significance happened and 
consequently three separate financial services regulators, namely 
the CBM, the MFSC and the MSE continued to operate 
simultaneously. Indeed, the proposal to remove banking 
supervision from the Central Bank became an issue of political 
disagreement, with the Opposition suggesting that the CBM 
merited being kept as banking supervisor, indeed as the s ingle 
financial regulat01y agency, in view of its longer experience in 
financial supervision. Eventually, banking supervision passed to 
the MFSA in 2002.388 
The concept of "competent authority" was central to the project of 
establishing a single regulator for financial services in Malta. 
Rather than expressly mentioning the MFSC, and later the MFSA, 
each of the laws provided for the appointment by the Minister of 
Finance, by means of a government notice in the offic ial gazette, of 
a "competent authority" to administer the law and ensure 
compliance with its provisions. Incredibly, the MFSA still 
administers the insurance, investment services and banking lavvs 
u1i.der this extremely fragile administrative arrangement, which 1n 
385
·Which was the new name given 'io the fom1er Malta Stock Exchange Act. 
386 Legal Notices I and 2 of 2003 issued in tem1s of the FMA conferred on the MF°SA the 
roles of Listing Authority and of Competent Autholity, respectively; both effective from the 
3 January 2003. 
387 This policy was stated in J 994, anticipating by a number of years the steps taken in the 
UK by the new Blair administration which ended the Bank of England's role as banking 
regulator. 
388 Legal Notice 325 of 200 I, issued under the Banking Act, prov ided for the appointment of 
the MFSA as competent authority for the purposes of that Act with effect from I January 
2002. 
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theory means that its superv1s01y role in the sector may be 
tern1inated or changed by the mere publication of a ministerial 
order appointing some other body to replace it.389 This had been 
devised as a convenient mechanism for the transition from one 
regulatmy regime to another, for the eventual substitution of the 
"competent authority" in the sectors supervised by the CBM. 
Today, so many years later, the legal position remains the same. 
The same mechanism is still in operation. It is not only archaic but 
also untenable seeing that international obligations require the 
MFSA to have unambiguous competence, powers and autonomy of 
. 390 
operations. 
Even the ve1y recent Securitization Act391 is due to be administered 
by a "competent authority" for which post the MFSA has been 
197 
clearly already earn1arked.- -
Since 1 July 1997, Malta 's foremost financial services regulator 
started housing and incorporated the Registty of Companies. The 
office of the Registrar was largely modelled on the UK original and 
was founded in 1965 when the Commercial Pa1inerships Ordinance 
was passed. It was set up as a government depaiiment. In that 
month, the MFSC was assigned responsibility to administer the 
responsibilities of the Registrar under the new Companies Act, 
which in 1995 completely overhauled the Ordinance.393 Most 
single regulato1y agencies do not have a similar responsibility for 
comparnes. 
389 See article 2A of the Investment Services Act, and article 3 of the Banking Act, 
respectively Chapters 370 and 37 1 of the Laws of Malta 
390 In the writer's view, this mechanism has lost its best by date and should now be scrapped 
and consigned to history. It gives an impression of lack of confidence as to whether the new 
regulatory structures revised and reshaped since 1994 are certain and definite or merely a 
temporary experiment of sorts. 
39 1 Publ ished in April 2006 as Act V of2006. 
392 This results from the Parliamentary debates on the relative Bi ll. 
393 The Companies Act 1995 (Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta) came into force on 
.January 2006, rep lacing the Commercial Partnerships Ordinance 1962 (Chapter 168 of the 
Laws of Malta). 
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Consolidated Regulatory Structures in other Sectors in Malta 
It would be a mistake to assume that the concept of a single 
regulatory or administrative agency is exclusive to financ ial 
services. The question may arise in any area of business, especially 
when the sector has customarily been regulated on the strength of 
laws and structures developed on a piecemeal basis. The Malta 
Standards Authority now established under a separate law of 
2000394 merged all the function s formerly exercised separately by 
the Malta Board of Standards, the Food Standards Board and the 
Inspector of Weights and Measures, under different legislation 
d . .;:: l . . d l" 395 atmg 1rom t 1e s1xt1es an even ear 1er. 
The Consumer Affairs Act of 1994,396 as amended in 2000, was 
another deliberate attempt to place consumer protection under one 
oversight agency. The Director for Consumer Affa irs now acts as 
the single focal point for monitoring such diverse subj ects as the 
regulation of product safety and liability, mi slead ing and 
comparative advertising, guarantees in consumer sales, consumer 
credit and distance selling. This approach achieved better · 
coherence and cohesion and has recently been developed further by 
the administrative (but not statutory) merger of the functions of the 
Director for Consumer Affairs and the Director for Fair 
Competition into one single unit. These measures were intended to 
promote better synergy in the working of competition and 
consumer legislation. 
A similar process has been carried out in the tourism sector. 
R}ecemeal regulation of'the sector had, since the sixties, led to the 
adoption of a number oLdifferent laws and a variety of different 
regulatory bodies. These authoritie.s were assigned responsi bilities 
covering various tourism.-related op)rators and activities, such as 
travel agents, tour operators, hotels and restaurants, travel gu ides 
and beach-cleaning. Recently, government took the necessary 
steps to set up a separate new authority to conso lidate all these 
394 The Malta Standards Authority Act, Chapter 419 of the Laws of Malta. 
m The Weights and Measures Ordinance was adopted in 1910. 
396 Chapter 378 of the Laws of Malta. 
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various functions and to present to operators and other interested 
paiiies one single point of reference and one single authorisation 
agency for all tourism-related services. This consolidation exercise 
was also extended to the actual laws themselves, now conveniently 
replaced by one single consolidated legislation.397 The Malta 
Tourism Authority established by the Malta Travel and Tourism 
Services Act 1999398 has combined the functions formerly carried 
out by such disparate bodies as the Ministry of Tourism, the Hotels 
and Catering Establishments Board set up in the mid-sixties, and 
the National Tourism Organization (NTOM) fom1ed in the 
seventies. 399 
Regrettably, there are indications that the process of change 
appears to have unduly favoured the interests of operators at the 
expense of consumer rights. What is peculiar here is the rather 
obtrusive pa1iicipation of the private sector in the very hea1i of the 
governing Board of the Authority and executive structures. This 
paiiicipation is imbedded in the legislation itself. From strictly 
regulatory and consumer perspectives, it is arguable that the 
benefits of consolidation and streamlining in this case may have 
been outweighed by the increased influence that industiy now 
exerts on the decisions and policies of the new tourism authority.400 
397 This is not the case with financial services laws which continue to regulate the different 
sectors separately. 
398 Chapter 409 of the Laws of Malta. 
399 See article 53 of the 1999 Act. The Act had been preceded by a White Paper published 
in 1997 with the title: White Paper proposing the setting up of a Malta Tourism Authority 
with powers to regulate tourism services and operations and for the promotion pf Tourism to 
Malta under the Malta Tourism Services Act 1997. The Act as eventually re-named and 
adopted in 1999 broadly consolidated and replaced five different pieces of legislation 
adopted since the mid-sixties, namely the Tourist Guide Services Act 1995 (Chapter 190 of 
the Laws of Malta), the Hotel and Catering Establishments Act 1967 (Chapter 197), the 
Guest Houses and Holiday Furnished Premises Act 1975 (Chapter 240), the Travel 
Agencies and Hotel Services Act 1976 (Chapter 264), and the National Tourism 
Organization Act 1984 (Chapter 310). On the strength of this Act, the MTA became the 
sole licensing body for tourism-related activities, from travel agents and tour operators to 
hotels, and tourist guides and excursion operators. 
'
00 This view recently found support in a landmark decision by the Commission for Fair 
Trading which found that the composition of the MT A was unsound as it breached the laws 
and principles of fair competition. See Bargain Holidays Limited et vs. Malta Tourism 
Authority decided on 17 October 2005 (Complaint 1/2004). 
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Another recent consolidation exercise was the setting up of a new 
statutory corporation under the name of Malta Enterpri se in 
2003.401 This new agency seeks to promote Malta as a suitable 
location for inward investment and assists in the se11ing up of 
enterprises. It merged the functions and roles of three former 
specialized bodies, namely the Malta Development Corporation 
(MDC), the Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprise Limited 
(IPSE) and Malta External Tracie Company Limited (METCO). 
During the Parliamentary debate on the Bill , the government side 
went to considerable lengths to emphasize the benefits of 
streamlining of procedures, better efficiency and coherence and 
economies of scale that should result from this development. 
A single regulator - a few of the features, concerns, perceived 
advantages and disadvantages 
The legal form that a regulato1y structure adopts defines its abi I ity 
to act autonomously and its credibility as an effective force in 
society. There can be no doubt that a single regulatory body is a 
potentially powerful entity. In order to be effective in its role, it 
must achieve respectability, securing the respect and confidence of 
operators, the public as well as of other authorities, local and 
foreign. A single regulator needs to have the confidence and 
strength to resist unwarranted pressure and lobbyin g from political 
and business sources. Appropriate measmes guaranteeing fairn ess, 
transparency and accountability should therefore be in place . It 
should also be seen to be using its considerable powers fairl y and 
judiciously. The level of transparency, accountability and 
i1idependence varies and each count1y needs to establish its own 
desirable and workable levels in tune with its political development 
and democratic evolution, as well. as with consumer and public 
perceptions and expectati9ns . Clear!¥, however, some systems are 
better structured and resourced to guarantee autonomy, 
transparency and fairness, than others. The greater the powers 
assigned to a regulatory agency, the stronger shou Id be the 
40 1 The Malta Enterprise Corporation Act 2003, Chapter 463 of the Laws of Malta. See 
especially Parts V and VI. 
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institutional safeguards in favour of fair dealing, transparency and 
accountability. 
More empirical studies would be required to assess whether a 
single unified regulatory structure is invariably more efficient and 
effective than a multiple agency structure. The disadvantages of 
having multiple regulators operating w ithin one jurisdiction may 
include regulator-shopping, inefficient procedures, bureaucracy, 
higher costs, uncertain regulatory boundaries, overlaps and gaps, a 
potential for costly rivahy and misunderstandings, lack of 
accountability and consumer confusion. A multi-agency situation 
would necessitate the adoption of laws which describe fine and 
often aiiificial distinctions between various financial services and 
products, an exercise often motivated primarily by jurisdictional-
territorial concerns. These laws would also likely attempt to 
resolve the allocation and detennination of superviso1y 
responsibility for hybrid products, a phenomenon which is on the 
mcrease. 
The consolidation of supervisory duties within one agency should 
offer a number of benefits. Since regulation is always expensive to 
cany out and is never cost-neutral, the possible gains from 
economies of scale, paiiicularly in smaller countries cannot be 
ignored. For a multi-service firm operating in more than one field 
of financial services, the single authority should secure certain 
advantages, such as lower fees and compliance costs, better 
streamlined and consistent procedures and expectations, reduction 
of paper-work, standardised application forms and returns, and 
generally greater consistency and harmonisation of standards 
across the industiy. Additionally, where supervis01y skills are 
scarce, the case for consolidating them in a single authority 
becomes stronger, particularly in smaller countries. 
A single regulator should at the very least guarantee that opei:ators, 
consumers of financial services and other interested pa1iies would 
have only one very convenient single point of reference. The risk 
of operators and consumers being shunted from one agency to 
another would no longer arise. This advantage would also benefit 
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other national authorities such as the compet1t1on authorities, as 
well as foreign authorities and international organisations which 
would prefer to have dealings with a single organization. A si ngle 
supervisory agency removes any doubts as to where responsibility 
lies and excludes the possibility of passing the buck. 
On the other side, one has to balance these factors against the 
potential disadvantages. A single unified regulator is a potentially 
very powerful entity. Accordingly, the legal system would need to 
introduce sufficient counter-weight safeguards to ensure 
administrative c01Tectness, adequate judicial redress. and 
accountability and rep01ting obligations. In some cases, regulators 
are appointed by Parliament and have been made directly 
answerable to it. Adequate safeguards against administrative abuse 
and political interference would need to be introduced. Critics of 
the single regulatory structure might also point out that: 
(a) It might prove easier for lobbying groups and other interests 
to influence one entity than say three different bodies; 
(b) A single regulator might simply conve1t formerly external 
divisions into its internal structure by creating units or departments 
dealing separately and exclusively with banking, insurance and 
securities business (the so-called "silo" effect); 
( c) The establishment of a single regulator excludes potentially 
healthy competition between regulators to the detriment of 
consumers; and 
' · 
(d) It might foster unrealistic expectations from consumers (and 
possibly also operators) who may e~pect too much from the unified 
single regulator. 
Additionally, some may prefer smaller superviso1y agencies which 
are more focussed, more specialised and have more specific 
objectives, on the assumption that, despite the increasing 
concentration, the traditional distinctions betvveen the different 
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areas of financial services will still broadly exist for the foreseeable 
future. 
Whatever the case may be, the setting up of a single unified 
regulator needs to be supported by financial services legislation of 
a high quality; laws that do not create unrealistic distinctions 
between financial services and which are sufficiently flexible to 
allow periodic updating and efficient response to the ever-changing 
business environment. The laws should ensure finn and resolute 
regulation of financial firms, high levels of consumer protection, 
fair competition, as well as the punishment of bad and fraudulent 
operators. Equally important, the laws should impose standards of 
fairness, accountability and transparency on the supervis01y agency 
itself. 
No administrative structure can by itself guarantee good and 
effective regulation. Whatever administrative airnngements a 
country chooses to adopt, the two impo1iant elements of quality 
staff and quality legislation remain basic ingredients for effective 
regulation. Where established, a single regulator should be able to 
retain and draw on the skills and knowledge formerly developed 
and housed in the various regulators. An advantage of the single 
supervisory entity is to concentrate expe1iise deriving from 
different field of competence sharing experiences, techniques and 
kno"wledge. Supervisory personnel have to be sufficiently well 
remunerated and motivated in order to be able to match the 
expertise of the private sector. If these foundations are securely in 
place, a regulatory agency can start to achieve the credibility it 
shall require to operate efficiently and fairly . 
The question whether a single regulat01y system is more efficient 
than a multi-agency structure cannot be answered in abstract tenns. 
One would have to first draw up the conect criteria and parameters 
for establishing what an efficient and effective regulato1y authority 
means. Any claim that a pa1iicular supervisory arrangement is 
better than another is spurious in the absence of adequate objective 
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empirical evidence, which regrettably is not readily available.'102 
Each country establishes the system best suited to its 
circumstances. 
Conclusion 
The setting up of a single unified authority is never an end in itself, 
but is a means of achieving a higher objective. fn the final 
analysis, an administrative agency is just a mechanism that can 
only be as good as the quality, commitment, reliability and 
expertise of its personnel and the quality of the laws it has to 
administer. The true objective must be to devise an effective, 
coherent, credible and efficient regulato1y agency that could 
provide the best guarantees to operators, consumers and the general 
public. 
A primary concern of this paper was to avoid any suggestion that 
having a single unified regulator or administrative agency is some 
miraculous solution to all the problems in financial services and 
other business sectors. It is not and cannot be. Sometimes, 
expectations from single regulators appear unduly optimistic, 
giving rise to what has frequently been termed "moral ho:wrd'. 
Fmihermore, unless properly planned and managed, the transition 
from a fragmented system to the establishment of a single 
regulatory agency may prove a disruptive and wasteful exercise, 
and ironically risk becoming itself a serious problem for the sector. 
We have seen that Malta was ce1iainly not unique or the first to· 
uhdertake the single regulatory project. Several other countries, 
both in Europe and ylsewhere, had implemented or were 
considering this regulatory framework. What is remarkable is that 
even in the various juris~ictions which have adopted it, the single 
agency structure has taken differe1{t shapes. Indeed, one finds 
difficulty in pointing out two jurisdictions with perfectly identical 
single agency structures. The reason may be that no standard off 
the shelf or one-size-fits-all model ex ists, whether within the strict 
m Most data is usually furnished by the regulatory agencies themselves. 
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single regulator framework or outside it. Additionally, the concept 
is understood differently in different countries, revealing an 
unsuspected flexibility and elasticity in the concept and in its 
various applications. 
The MFSA may be considered a rare breed among single 
regulators. Not quite a new entity, it is the legal successor to two 
former regulatory structures, whose roles it has continued and 
developed. This project was finally sealed by the important 2002 
amendments to what was then the MFSC Act (now the MFSA 
Act). This Authority has in stages taken over the supervisory 
functions originally (and traditionally) vested in government or in 
other domestic regulatory agencies, including the Minister of 
Finance and the Registry of Companies. It would appear that the 
MFSA is the only public agency which has graduated from a small 
and exclusively offshore regulator into a comprehensive integrated 
financial services supervisor. In this respect, the Maltese 
experience may indeed be unique. 
Some abbreviations used in this paper: 
MIBA - Malta International Business Authority 
MFSC - Malta International Financial Centre 
MFSA - Malta Financial Services Authority 
CBM - Central Bank of Malta 
MSE - Malta Stock Exchange 
WTO - World Trade Organization 
EU - European Union 
Selective Sources and Materials 
Local legislation 
Insurance Business Act 1981 (now repealed) 
Malta Financial Services Authority Act 1988 
Financial Markets Act 1990 
(formerly the Malta Stock Exchange Act 1990) 
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Investment Services Act 1994 
Banking Act 1994 
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Insurance Business Act 1998 
Prevention of Financial Markets Abuse Act 2005 
Consumer Affairs Act 1994 
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Some useful websites 
Local: 
www.mfsa.com. mt, 
\V'Nw.centralbankmalta.com 
EU: 
\V\vw.fsa.gov.uk, 
www.bancaditalia.it, 
\Vww.consob.it, 
www.isvap.it, 
\VWw.banque-france.fr, 
www.amf-france.fr, 
\VWW.fi.ee, 
wv,n.v.cnb.cz, 
www.nbs.sk 
Other: 
www.fsa.go.ip (Japan), 
www.gfsc.gg (Guernsey), 
www.jerseyfsc.org, 
www.centralbankbahamas.com, 
www.bidc.com (Barbados), 
W\.Vw.central-bank.org.tt (Trinidad and Tobago), 
\.Vww.bom.intnet.mm (Mauritius) 
,David Fabri 
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